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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through 
its ENGINEERING COMMISSION, 
D. H. Whittenburg, Chairman, H. J. 
Corleissen and Layton Maxfield, 
Members of the ENGINEERING 
COMMISSION, 
Appellant and Plaintiff, 
vs. 
BURTON F. PEEK and CHARLES 
D. WIMAN, Trustees under the Will 
and of the Estate of CHARLES H. 
DEERE, Deceased, 
Respondents and Defendants. 
Case No. 8290 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This action was commenced by the State of Utah to 
condemn property for "This Is The Place" Monument 
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Park. (R. 1-20) Respondents' property was "actually 
taken" by Final Judgment of Condemnation duly made, 
entered and recorded May 27, 1952. (R. 43-51) 
On appeal by respondents from the money judgment 
first entered determining the value of respondents' 
property so taken, the Supreme Court reversed the trial 
court with direction to grant a new trial in a decision 
by Wade, J., reported as State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 
P. 2d 630. 
On re-trial, the judgment from which appeal is now 
taken was entered November 5, 1954 (R. 97-99) on the 
jury's verdict as to the only issues of fact presented 
below, that is, as to the fair market values of the items 
of respondents' property taken by the Final Judgment 
of Condemnation. On this appeal the State now raises 
two major questions of law pertaining to the trial court's 
rulings as to evidence and instructions, asserting the 
alleged errors to be fatal to the verdict and judgment 
entered thereon. 
The first of these major contentions concerns the 
fair market value of Parcel 1 (Ex. 1). This was the 
completed subdivision described in the court's Pre-
trial Order. (R, 52) At the second trial, experts for 
appellant valued Parcel 1 at $163,250.00, $148,883.00, 
and $169,000.00. (R. 366, 437,474) Those for respondents 
valued it as $310,000.00, $302,000.00, and $309,700.00, re-
2 
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spectively. (R. 182, 238, 270.) The jury found the fair 
market value of Parcel 1 on July 12, 1951 to be $260,-
100.00. (R. 93) 
As stated in Appellant's Brief, the wide disparity 
in the expert opinions as to value was the result of the 
application of different appraisal methods by the 
opposing experts. Experts for the State relied upon and 
applied the "income" (R. 351), or the "residual" (R. 
426), or the "summation" (R. 477, 491) approach. In 
their opinion, as experts, that was the most appropriate 
formula or method to apply in estimating fair market 
value. In applying this formula, these experts assumed 
the obvious—that the best use of the property was for 
subdivision and sale as residential lots. However, they 
then approached the valuation as would a speculator. 
They first computed the retail sale values of the lots. 
Then they computed all conceivable possible future 
expenses which a speculator purchasing the entire parcel 
at a single sale might have to make, including his profit 
and interest on his investment. The sum thus obtained 
was then subtracted from the market value of the lots. 
This, said the experts, is the amount which one or a 
number of speculating snbdividers would be willing to 
pay for the entire tract; thus this is the fair market value 
of Parcel 1. (R. 377) 
Experts testifying for respondents admitted that 
this residual approach was appropriate from a sub-
divider's position where "raw acreage" was concerned 
3 
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(e. g. R. 226-8, 264), but stated that in their opinions 
that approach was unreliable in appraising Parcel 1 
because in fact it was not "raw acreage" (e.g. R. 229, 
265). All witnesses agreed that except for Tract 1-C, 
Parcel 1 was not raw acreage but had been substantially 
improved; and that the lots contained therein were 
available for immediate sale in their then condition on 
July 12,1951. (e.g. R. 480) The parcel contained streets, 
curbs, gutters and water, gas, power and telephone 
lines. (R. 52) Some twenty of the lots had been sold 
and all others were then available for immediate sale. 
(e.g. R. 485) Because of the improved condition of 
Parcel 1, experts for respondents accordingly applied 
principally the "comparative" approach (e.g. R. 225, 
291), whereby the fair market value of the property on 
the specified date was determined by comparing the 
land condemned with other similar land where known 
sales of a similar nature had actually occurred at about 
the time involved. They utilized the income or residual 
approach only for purposes of checking the values 
obtained in using the comparative approach, (e.g. R. 
230) 
On cross examination, experts testifying for the 
State admitted the repute, integrity and qualification 
of respondents' experts. (R. 391, 485) We thus simply 
have a situation where qualified experts disagree. There 
was an honest difference of opinion as to the appropriate 
process to use in determining the fair market value of 
Parcel 1 on July 12,1951. The jury, acting entirely within 
4 
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its province, reached its own valuation of the property 
after considering the opinions of opposing experts. 
(R. 93) 
Parcels 2 and 3, the remaining land items for assess-
ment, were also designated without objection by the 
pre-trial order. (R. 52) The first tract abutted Oak-
hills Drive on the north side of Emigration Canyon, and 
had been platted but neither surveyed nor recorded. 
Parcel 3 was a somewhat similar tract abutting Kennedy 
Drive on the Canyon's south side. In contrast with 
Parcel 1 (the "finished product" or virtually completed 
subdivision. (R. 229) Parcels 2 and 3 were primarily 
paper subdivisions — acreage suitable for future resi-
dential use (R. 128 et seq.), and were so treated and 
valued by all of the various experts, (e.g. R. 229, 255, 
278) 
Thus the specific objections raised by appellant to 
the jury's verdict as to Parcel 1 are not present as to 
either Parcel 2, valued by the jury at $91,500.00, or as 
to Parcel 3, valued at $70,000.00. (R. 93) 
The second major contention concerns the valuation 
of the water-works owned by respondents, the fourth and 
last item to be assessed. (R. 52, 81) At the first trial, 
the court refused to admit expert testimony as to the 
value of the water-works system. This court, in State 
v. Peek, supra, held that such refusal by the trial court 
5 
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was error. At the re-trial, the court admitted the testi-
mony of Mr. Ullrich over the objection of appellant, thus 
conforming to the judgment of this court in State v. 
Peek, supra. (R. 313-314) 
Appellant now assigns the admission of this evidence 
as prejudicial error. It admits that respondents were 
properly compensated for the taking of the water right, 
but contends that respondents should not be compensated 
for the taking of the balance of their water-works system. 
Thus appellant would pay respondents no more for the 
property involved than if they owned only the land 
and a water right, and some third party owned the 
water-works system. 
It is of course true as contended by appellant that 
the experts for respondents in appraising the land in 
Parcel 1 "considered" (along with all other such 
factors) the incidental benefits of the presence of the 
water system. However, such witnesses expressly stated 
that the value of the waterworks system was not included 
(e.g. R. 231). Respondents owned both the land amd the 
fully developed water-works system. The presence of 
the water system, regardless of its ownership, of course 
increased the values of the land where the water could 
be beneficially used. However, the fact that a single per-
son owned both the water system and the land where it 
could be put to use, should not cause it to forfeit to the 
State the value of the water system. 
6 
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Mr. Ullrich, testifying for respondents, stated that 
in his opinion, the value of the water collection, trans-
mission, storage, and distribution system was $93,400.00 
exclusive of the value of the water right. (R 314) 
Appellant objected to, but did not contradict this testi-
mony. The competency and credibility of Mr. Ullrich is 
not challenged. The jury by its verdict resolved the 
issue by assigning a fair market value of $82,927.00 to 
both the water-works and the water rights. (K. 93) 
That this value was to be a part of the award of just 
compensation to the Deere Estate had theretofore been 
established by this court on the first appeal as the law 
of this case; and the trial court so ruled. (R 52) 
Thus now before this court by way of the present 
appeal is first an attempt to change its decision in State 
v. Peek as to the water system; and then to persuade 
this court that errors were made by the trial court below 
in its rulings as to evidence and instructions which were 
sufficiently pre judical to require that the jury's present 
verdict as to the values of the last three parcels of the 
Monument Park area should be set at naught. 
Insofar as practical, respondents will meet the seven-
teen such errors alleged by appellant in the order pre-
sented by Appellant's Brief, under the seven points stated 
hereafter. 
7 
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II. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
Point 1. 
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the 
determination of fair market values of the land condemned. 
Point 2. 
The court properly denied the motion of appellant to 
strike the testimony of Witnesses Ralph B. Wright, H. 
Mervin Wallace and Joseph E. Benedict as to valuation of 
Parcel 1. 
Point 3. 
The court committed no error in admitting evidence, 
refusing to strike evidence, or in instructing the jury con-
cerning the valuation of the water system. 
Point 4. 
The court properly limited the evidence proffered by 
expert witnesses Solomon and Ashton. 
Point 5. 
The court properly gave Instruction 15, and properly 
refused to give Requested Instructions 14 and 15. 
8 
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Point 6. 
The failure of the court to instruct as to burden of 
proof, if error, was not prejudicial. 
Point 7. 
The court properly included and computed interest in 
the judgment below. 
III. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1. 
The trial court properly instructed the jury as to the 
determination of fair market values of the land condemned. 
a. The instructions of the court were consistent with 
its pre-trial order. 
The pre-trial order (to which no objection was made) 
divided the property into eight separate parcels to facili-
tate orderly and systematic procedure. (R. 52-3) In-
struction Number 11 following the pre-trial order states 
as follows: (R. 81-2) 
For the purpose of assessing the compensa-
tion to which defendant may be entitled, the whole 
area of defendant's property has, by order of the 
9 
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court, been divided into eight parcels. Parcel 1 is 
all that area colored yellow on the map, Exhibit 1, 
which lies north of State Eoad No. 65; Parcel 2 
is the area colored purple, abutting Oakhills 
Drive; Parcel 3 is the area colored purple, abutting 
on Kennedy Drive, and including the small semi-
circle colored purple farther up the canyon; 
Parcel 4 is the area colored red; Parcel 5 is 
the area colored brown; Parcel 6 is the area 
colored yellow which lies at the southwest corner 
of the map; 
Parcel 7 is the area colored green; and Parcel 
8 is the area colored blue. 
Each area is shown on the map and desig-
nated by its parcel number. 
All of the areas which are left in white on 
Exhibit 1 belong to some owner other than the 
Deere Estate, and the respective owners have 
been paid just compensation for such areas. The 
value of such areas is therefore not to be com-
puted in the compensation due the Deere Estate. 
The parties have agreed on the values of the 
lands in Parcels numbered 4, 5, 6, 7, and 8, and 
these tracts are not involved in this action; there-
fore, no evidence as to their value has been given, 
and you will not consider the value of such tracts. 
Your consideration and duty will be confined to 
determining the following matters: 
(a) The fair market value of Parcel 1 on 
July 12,1951. 
(b) The fair market value of Parcel 2 on 
July 12, 1951. 
10 
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(c) The fair market value of Parcel 3 on 
July 12, 1951. 
(d) The fair market value of the water 
system and works installed by defendants 
in the development of the subdivision 
project. 
You will determine separately the value of 
each of the four items numbered (a), (b), (c), 
(d), and from the evidence in the case, viewed 
and construed in the light of the law as given in 
these instructions, and return a verdict showing 
the value you find as to each parcel or item, 
and the total of all. We will furnish you a form 
of verdict for your convenience. 
b. The court at no time divided Parcel 1 into 62 parcels 
for purposes of evaluation. 
It is true that evidence of the value of such lots 
without objection by the State was admitted, but solely 
for the purpose of enabling the jury to understand the 
manner in which the expert witnesses arrived at their 
opinions as to fair market value of the whole of Parcel 
1 as of July 12,1951. The court properly and adequately 
instructed the jury how to determine itself the fair 
market value of Parcel 1 as a unit by its Instructions 
12 and 13 as follows: (R. 83-4) 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12 
It is elemental on determining fair value that 
the owner is entitled to the value of the property 
11 
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for the highest and best use to which it could be 
put at the time of taking. 
Evidence in this case is undisputed that 
Parcel 1 on July 12, 1951 consisted of sixty-two 
lots, together with the small tract abutting State 
Highway 65 designated 1-C. Twenty-two lots of 
the eighty-four lots originally in the parcel had 
been sold to other persons prior the condemnation 
date, and the sixty-two remaining lots as of July 
12, 1951 were suitable and available for use for 
residential purposes, and each was held by the 
defendants for sale as such. Tract 1-C likewise 
under the undisputed evidence had as its highest 
and best use, subdivision into lots and use for 
residential purposes, and this tract was then 
suitable and available for such use. 
The owner is entitled to the fair market value 
of all of the components of Parcel 1 as the prop-
erty actually existed physically on July 12, 1951. 
It is not proper to select a less advantageous or 
less profitable use as the basis for determining 
the owner's damages than the highest and best 
use to which each of the components could actually 
be put at the time of the taking in its then con-
dition. Specifically, the defendants may not be 
required to hold as mere acreage available and 
suitable for sale as such to another or other sub-
dividers, who in turn would sell it as lots to others, 
the lots in Parcel 1 into which a portion of the 
property had been divided. 
INSTKIICTION NO. 13 
As to that part of the lands in Parcel 1 on 
which the subdivision work had progressed so far 
that sales could be made by lots and houses built 
12 
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thereon for immediate use, the witnesses on values 
were permitted to testify with reference to values 
of separate lots. This was permitted to enable 
you to understand the ways the witnesses, in 
making their appraisals of value, work, in 
arriving at their opinions as to the fair market of 
the whole parcel; the matters they deemed as 
affecting the market value of the property and 
why and to what extent. 
You may consider this evidence in determin-
ing the weight and value to be given to their 
opinions as to value, j ^nd^ l so^J I^J^^^a^ iB 
axrjviiigLja^jour verdict as to the fair market 
value of ParceTlTon July 12, 1951. 
You will not return a verdict as to the value 
of each separate lot, but a verdict f<or the total 
value of all the land embraced within Parcel 
1, as your deliberations may determine. 
Part of the land in Parcel 1 marked 1-C had 
not been subdivided and was not saleable as lots 
ready for use on July 12, 1951. These lands were 
evaluated by the witnesses on an acreage basis 
as a solid tract. You may determine the value 
of such lands apart from the value of the platted 
part, but the two must be added together to fix 
the value of the entire parcel in your verdict. 
(Italics ours.) 
Appellant contends on pages 15 and 16 of its brief 
that these Instructions 12 and 13 in effect directed the 
jury that it " could and should value each lot in Parcel 
1 individually based upon the testimony of appraisers 
for respondents and that their verdict be a mathematical 
13 
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total of all of the 62 lots in Parcel 1." It is submitted 
that such is obviously not the fact. Instruction 12 
advised the jury of the highest and best use of Parcel 
1 as agreed by appellant's own experts; that the owner 
is entitled to the fair market value of all of the com-
ponents of Parcel 1 as it existed on July 12, 1951; and 
that the improved portion of Parcel 1 may not be 
treated as raw unimproved acreage available for sale 
only to another subdivider or other subdividers. 
By Instruction 13 the court explained to the jury 
why the evidence of value of each lot was admitted, and 
directed that it might be considered with other evidence 
in determining the fair market value of the entire parcel. 
The only reference by the court to mathematical com-
putation was the direction in the last sentence of Instruc-
tion 13 to add the values of the platted portion to the 
unplatted portion of Parcel 1 in order to arrive at the 
value for the entire parcel. An alternative within the 
court's discretion would have been to have further 
divided Parcel 1 into two or still more parcels for 
separate assessments pursuant to statute (Judicial Code, 
9 U.C.A. Sec. 78-34-10(1); State v. Peek, supra.) 
c. Instructions Number 9 and 17, to which appellant 
also objects, were proper. 
On page 15 of its brief, appellant as to Instruction 
9 states as follows: 
14 
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1
' By that instruction the trial court told the 
jury that they should disregard all of the evidence 
proffered by the State's appraisers and that they 
should consider each of the sixty-two lots as a 
single parcel.'y 
Again, it is submitted that such is simply not so. 
Instruction 9 wras as follows: 
The fair market value of a parcel of prop-
erty is based upon the value of that parcel apart 
from and regardless of who may be the owner. 
It does not change because of the color, creed, 
financial status or residence of the owner, or the 
fact that the owner owns other properties which 
may or may not be affected by the condemnation 
proceeding against the particular parcels which 
are being taken. The fact that these defendants 
ow~n a relatively large part of the entire area to 
be condemned, does not subject them to any so-
called wholesale discounts, or require you to 
assume that all of their property must be pur-
chased by a single purchaser at a single sale. 
You are to determine the just compensation to 
be paid on the basis of the fair market value of 
the various parcels of the property taken, regard-
less who happened to own the property at the 
time the condemnation action was brought. 
(Italics ours.) 
The sixty-two lots are not even mentioned in this 
instruction. However, the court does instruct that each 
of the parcels should be valued separately without giving 
any weight to their ownership. The parcels referred} 
to are obviously the/^eighti parcels specified by the pre 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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trial order and which were set out in different colors on 
Exhibit 1. That exhibit was on a blackboard before the 
jury and was constantly referred to during the trial. 
(R. 106) Even if one could become confused about what 
the court meant by "parcels," any conceivable ambiguity 
or uncertainty would be cured by Instruction Number 
11, quoted supra, in which the court describes in detail 
the eight parcels involved in this litigation and shown by 
Exhibit 1. 
Instruction 17 is also objected to by appellant. This 
states as follows: (R. 88) 
In determining the fair market value of the 
property taken and any part or parcel thereof, 
you are not to take into consideration any specu-
lative increase or decrease in values that may 
occur, or have occurred in the future; nor any 
consideration of future tax or sale commission 
that might be paid for future sales; nor any future 
special improvements that might be installed; 
norHtEe fact that it is the State which takes the 
land, nor the use they may make of it ; nor any 
possible future cost to the State, nor possible 
future expenses that defendants be saved by sell-
ing now; nor any interest the defendants might 
be saved or be entitled to receive; nor any 
expenses incident to this litigation. Any question 
of interest must be determined and fixed by the 
court. 
You are confined to the fair market value as 
of July 12, 1951. 
16 
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The authorities to the effect that in eminent domain 
proceedings the trier of fact is confined to existing 
conditions and values at the time of condemnation, and 
may not consider speculative future occurrences, are too 
numerous to need citation. It is 'submitted- that Instruc-
tion 17 was entirely proper. 
d. Appellant's Requested Instructions 10, 11 and 12 
were given in substance. 
Appellant alleges error in refusing to give a portion 
of Requested Instruction 10, and on page 16 of its 
brief "most strenuously urge" that the request was not 
covered in substance by other instructions. This portion 
instructed that the value of each parcel was "to be 
measured by the fair market value of such parcel as 
an entirety as of July 12, 1951." 
As was noted by the court (R. 65), this instruction 
was given in substance in other instructions, namely, in 
Instructions 5, 7, 9, 11, 12, 13,14, 17 and 20. (R. 75-91) 
Appellant's Requested Instruction 11, quoted on 
page 16 of its brief, was also given in substance in other 
instructions as noted by the court. (R. 66) The substance 
of this requested charge is very aptly set forth in Instruc-
tions 7 and 8 (R. 77-8) quoted in part as follows, to-wit: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
The owner of the land which is taken under 
proceedings in eminent domain for public use, is 
entitled to receive as just compensation for such 
taking the reasonable and fair market value of 
such land for the highest and best use of which 
the land is capable at the time of such taking. In 
this connection, you may consider use of appro-
priate tracts for subdivision, for commercial, for 
residential or for any other lawful purpose or use 
to which you believe the property could be or was 
best adapted. 
By fair market value is meant the price which 
property will bring when it is offered for sale by 
one who is willing but is not obliged to sell. In 
other words, the fair market value means the fair 
value between one who is willing to purchase and 
one who is willing to sell, when neither is acting 
under compulsion or necessity. The question is: 
If the defendants were willing to sell their prop-
erty, what could be obtained for it on the market 
from parties who were willing to buy and would 
give its full value for the most advantageous use 
to which the property is or could be adapted? 
The compensation to which the defendants in 
this case are entitled is to be determined with 
reference to the uses for which each of the various 
tracts of the property was suitable in its then 
condition on July 12, 1951, having regard to its 
location, situation and quality, and to the wants 
in that locality, or such as might reasonably be 
expected in the near future. The compensation 
being the value of the property for the highest 
and best use to which it could reasonably be put. 
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INSTBUCTION NO. 8 
4
'Just compensation", as used in these in-
structions, is such a sum of money as will make 
the property owner whole, so that, upon receipt 
of the same, he will be no poorer and no richer 
by reason of the taking of his property than he 
would be if the same were not taken. The term 
"just compensation77 means "just77 not only to 
the party whose property is taken for public use, 
but also "just77 to the party which is to pay for 
it, (Italics ours.) 
It is submitted that Appellant's Eequested Instruc-
tion 12, quoted on page 17 of its brief, was not a proper 
instruction because of the phrase "but your value must 
be the value of the whole of Parcel 1, the plotted and un-
plotted portions taken together as one unit," To give 
this instruction would be like telling the jury to value a 
horse and a cow, as a whole, together as a unit. The 
principal part of the parcel was fully improved with 
roads, utilities, etc. and contained lots available for im-
mediate sale to the public. Each of the six appraisers 
based his estimate of fair market value upon the value 
of the individual lots in this section of Parcel 1. As 
heretofore set forth, the difference in valuation between 
opposing witnesses resulted from the deduction by the 
State's experts of speculative selling costs from their 
"gross" market value in determining what they thought 
was 4' fair' ' market value. 
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However, all of the witnesses in this case valued the 
remainder of Parcel 1, which was still raw acreage, on 
an acreage basis. Thus the two areas within Parcel 1 
were fundamentally different and of necessity were 
valued independently by all witnesses. Therefore, in 
Instruction 13 (E. 84) the court directed: 
Part of the lands in Parcel 1 marked 1-C had not 
been subdivided and was not saleable as lots 
ready for use on July 12, 1951. These lands were 
evaluated by the witnesses on an acreage basis 
as a solid tract. You may determine the value of 
such lands apart from the value of the platted 
part, but the two must be added together to fix 
the value of the entire parcel in your verdict. 
With this exception, the substance of the requested 
instruction was given by the court in Instruction 13, 
quoted in full supra. 
e. The court did not err in giving Instruction 10 and 
rejecting Request No. 5. 
On page 18 of its brief appellant urges that the giv-
ing of Instruction 10 (B. 80) and the failure to give its 
Eequested Instruction 5 (E. 60) was prejudicial error. 
The reason given is that Instruction 10 does not properly 
define a willing seller and a willing buyer. The inference 
then is that the requested instruction does so properly 
define. The questioned instructions are as follows: 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
In ascertaining the fair market value of the 
defendants' property, it is not proper to assume 
either a single sale or a simultaneous sale. On the 
contrary, you must assume that the owner as a 
willing seller has a reasonable time under all the 
circumstances within which to dispose of his prop-
erty. Also as a willing seller, he has the right and 
it must be assumed that he may exercise that 
right, to dispose of the property in such a manner 
as would result in obtaining its fair market value 
for the highest and best use to which the property 
or any of its parts can be adapted. 
REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
The fact, if it is a fact, that an owner is un-
willing to sell, or objects to the condemnation, 
does not affect the market value. The measure of 
compensation in the case of an owner who objects 
to the taking of his property for a public use is 
in no respects different from the measure in the 
case of an owner who is willing that his property 
be taken for such use. 
It is submitted that neither of these instructions 
properly defines a willing buyer and a willing seller; 
that they were not intended to so define; that Instruc-
tion 7 (R. 77) quoted supra, to which appellant did not 
abject, does properly define a willing buyer and a willing 
seller; that the substance of Requested Instruction 5 is 
contained in Instruction 7; and that Instruction 10 was 
entirely proper as a cautionary supplement to Instruc-
tion 7 and the other instructions given in the extensive 
charge of the court to the jury. (R. 74-92.) 
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On pages 38 and 39 of appellant's brief, reference 
is made to the alleged error in giving Instruction 10 and 
refusing Requested Instruction 5. As an additional 
ground for error, appellant alleges " there is no time 
limitation placed upon i t . " We submit that this is not 
error, for in Instructions 5, 7, 11,12, 13, 14,15,17,18 and 
20 the date of evaluation was expressly set forth. The 
omission could not possibly have misled the jury and was 
cured by the frequent admonition for the jury to value 
the property as of July 12 1951. 
Summing up appellant's objections to the court 's in-
structions, we submit that a reading of Judge Larson's 
careful and extensive charge (R, 74-92), having the rela-
tively simple issues in mind, will satisfy this reviewing 
tribunal that the jury was fully and correctly advised as 
to the law and as to its function and duties. Appellant 's 
objections are neither well-taken nor could prejudicial 
error result from that to which complaint is made on 
appeal. 
(Appellant's Point 1 (F) , relating to its motion to 
strike certain evidence, will next be covered separately.) 
Point 2. 
The court properly denied the motion of appellant to 
strike the testimony of Witnesses Ralph B. Wright, H. 
Mervin Wallace and Joseph E. Benedict as to valuation of 
Parcel 1. 
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Appellant does not question the following proposi-
tions: 
(1) Fair market value is a question of fact for the 
jury. 
(2) The jury may consider the opinions of quali-
fied experts as to fair market value. 
(3) All of Parcel 1 except that part marked 1-C on 
Exhibit 1 was fully improved and available for 
immediate sale to the public as residential lots 
at the time of condemnation. 
(4) The highest and best use of Parcel 1 was the 
sale of the subdivided lots for residential 
purposes. 
(5) Witnesses Wright, Wallace and Benedict were 
qualified experts. 
(6) Their concept of fair market value was 
proper, and was the same as those of witnes-
ses testifying for appellant. 
(7) Both the ' ' income," i' residual,'' and the i i com-
parative" approaches are commonly used by 
appraisers to determine fair market values. 
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The only and particular complaint of appellant (and 
its argument of Point I-F in pages 19 through 38 of its 
brief) is that witnesses Wright, Wallace and Benedict 
for the owners utilized a wrong approach in reaching an 
opinion as to the fair market value of Parcel 1. The 
State contends in substance that the comparative ap-
proach is not an appropriate method when applied to 
Parcel 1, but that the income or residual approach is the 
only proper approach. 
This contention is itself an opinion. A search of the 
record does not disclose any statement by appellant's 
own experts that the comparative approach is not a 
proper one to apply in appraising Parcel 1. They simply 
state that in their opinions the residual approach was 
here more appropriate. Respondent's experts, however, 
expressed opinions that while the residual approach 
might be appropriate in appraising raw acreage from 
the subdivider's point of view, it is not a satisfactory 
method of appraising a fully developed subdivision 
available for immediate sale to the public, (e. g. B. 229) 
It is submitted that neither counsel nor the court is 
the proper person to select the only appropriate method 
of appraising Parcel 1. Reputable and qualified experts 
could not agree. Their testimony was conflicting. In 
such instance, the jury is the proper moderator. 29 
C. J. S. 1297, Sec. 289. The court properly admitted the 
testimony of all of the experts and instructed the jury 
as to the correct way to consider and weigh such testi-
mony by Instructions 20 and 21. (R. 91-2.) 
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Appellant cites no cases which hold that evidence of 
the retail value of lots in a completed subdivision is not 
proper. As has been repeatedly stated, Parcel 1, with the 
exception of section or tract 1-C, was fully subdivided 
into residential lots, fully improved, and held and ready 
for immediate sale to the public. The Deere Estate had 
been developing this area for a period of many, many 
years as a residential subdivision. The long-range plan-
ning, engineering, and development had been substan-
tially completed prior the time of condemnation. An ex-
tensive water system had been developed and installed. 
Power, telephone and gas lines had been laid under-
ground, a selling program had been adopted. The lots 
were fully divided. The roads were completed with the 
exception of a final hot plant mix which winter weather 
had delayed. Mr. Solomon on cross examination (E. 480) 
admitted that every lot in the subdivision was available 
for immediate sale as residential lots on July 12, 1951. 
The only other work which in his opinion was necessary 
was the marking of the lot corners with stakes. How-
ever, he admitted that some of the lots had already been 
sold without such marking. (E. 494) No conflict existed 
as to these physical facts. 
Under these circumstances, respondents submit that 
it was entirely proper for the court to admit opinion 
evidence as to the retail value of each lot in Parcel 1. 
Such values were taken into consideration by all of the 
experts in arriving at their opinions as to the fair mar-
ket value of the whole parcel, and no objection was made 
by the State when such evidence was offered. 
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Three cases, as follows, each cited and quoted from 
by appellant, alone completely justify the action of the 
court in refusing to strike the expert testimony so ad-
mitted : 
(1) The California case of Redwood City Elemen-
tary School District v. Gregotre, 276 P. 2d 78, cited by 
appellant on page 38 of its brief, most definitely justifies 
the consideration of the lot values in Parcel 1 by the jury. 
That case is particularly strong for respondents' posi-
tion. There the property consisted of 12.23 acres of land 
containing acacia and eucalyptus trees, a six-bedroom 
home, a barbecue with kitchen and dance hall, workmen's 
quarters, garage, hay barn, chicken coops, sheep barns 
and acreage of farm land devoted to raising flowers. 
However, the expert appraisers all agreed that the high-
est and best use of the property would be for subdivision 
purposes, and that it could be divided into 60 separate 
lots. As noted, no subdivision had as then been initiated. 
Quoting from appellant's brief, page 38: 
"The two appraisers for the school district 
gave figures of $78,750.00 and $78,400.00, while 
the two appraisers for the owner gave $153,000.00 
and $146,750.00; cmd this last figure was demon-
strated as a mathemathieal total of the value of 
each of the sixty lots, A jury returned a verdict 
of $83,500.00 and the owner appealed. The appel-
late court affirmed hold (holding?) that it was 
proper to submit both sets of values to the jury 
***." (Italics ours.) 
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The property in this Gregoire case was not sub-
divided. It was raw acreage. Yet, the experts were per-
mitted to justify their opinions as to fair market value 
by showing the mathematical computations of the sums 
of the retail sale price of each lot. Lots in this case were 
conjectural only. None existed in fact. Not only would 
extensive development be necessary to make the lots 
ready for sale, but the existing buildings would have to 
be razed. 
(2) State v. Deal, 233 P. 2d 242, cited by appellant 
at page 35 of its brief, though also dealing with raw 
acreage, is cited by respondents for dictum justifying 
the consideration by the jury in this case of the value of 
actual individual lots in Parcel 1. There the property 
was hilly ocean-side porperty. It was completely unim-
proved. No subdivision had been made. The land was 
raw acreage. Since the land was completely unimproved, 
the court stated: 
''probable value of lots that do not exist is too 
speculative,'' 
However, the court aded by way of dictum that: 
"Evidence which is speculative in one situation 
may not be so m others. Thus, in County of Blue 
Earth v. St. Paul & Sioux City R Co., 28 Minn. 
503, 11 N. W. 73, the court, per Mitchell, J., held 
it proper for witnesses on value to adopt as a 
basis for their calculations the process of dividing 
the land into lots for residential purposes and 
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then calculating the market value of the property 
by lots. But the land in that case was city prop-
erty, in fact the court house square, while here 
we are dealing with a wild land on the Ocean 
Coast/' (Italics ours.) 
It is interesting to note that in the Minnesota case 
where evidence was allowed (involving the court house 
square) no subdivision had been attempted and razing 
would also be necessary. 
(3) Catlin v. Northern Coal and Iron Co., 225 Pa. 
262, 74 Atl. 56, cited by appellant's brief, page 24, in sup-
port of its contention that it was reversible error to deny 
its motion to strike the testimony of respondent's ex-
perts, is also cited by respondents for the opposite prop-
osition. There, a tract had been marked out on the 
ground into lots and streets. No improvements had been 
made. The owner advertised them for sale, but no sale 
was consummated because his offer was $500 per lot 
above the highest bid. A large number of witnesses tes-
tified as to the value of the property if sold as individual 
building lots. Appellant contended that it was reversible 
error for the trial court to refuse to strike such evidence. 
This issue was not reached on its merits because appel-
lant's objections were not properly presented. However, 
the trial court also refused to instruct the jury to dis-
regard such evidence as speculative and remote, but 
charged that such would be the case only if the estimates 
of lot value were based upon future sales. This instruc-
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tion allowed the jury to consider testimony as to market 
value of the lots at the time of condemnation. The court 
held that the charge was proper. In justifying its deci-
sion, the court distinguished the case from one where 
unimproved raw acreage was concerned as follows, to 
What was said in these cases, if not consid-
ered in connection with their facts, might appear 
to give support to the view now earnestly pressed 
upon us. These cases, however, must be read and 
understood in view of the situation at the time of 
the entry. The entry in these cases was made on 
farm land in rural districts, and they were not 
immediately available for sale as building lots. 
The effort was made to add a fictitious value to 
the lands entered upon by undertaking to show 
that they could be divided into lots, and might be 
sold for building purposes. I t was apparent, how-
ever, that this was all speculative, and had no 
real basis in fact. The lands appropriated were 
farm lands, and in determining their value it was 
necessary to limit the inquiry to those intrinsic 
elements of value existing at the time of the ap-
propriation. In the case last cited a witness was 
asked on preliminary cross-examination if his es-
timate was based upon what it would bring if it 
had been laid out in building lots, and all the lots 
had been sold at what he considered them worth, 
to which an affirmative answer was given. This 
court held that the method of estimating market 
value indicated by the answer of the witness was 
improper. This case is clearly right on the facts. 
The tract of land had not been laid out m lots. It 
was farm land. There was no immediate pros-
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pect of its being available for sale as building lots, 
and hence such a method of estimating value 
would be purely speculative. (Italics ours.) 
It is interesting to note that practically all of the 
authorities cited by the appellant refer specifically to un-
improved land where no subdivision has commenced. 
Each of them is therefore necessarily distinguished from 
the case at bar by the reasoning of Judge Elkin in Catlin 
v. Northern Coal & Iron Co., supra, cited by appellant. 
The following cited by appellant fall into this category: 
4 Nichols on Eminent Domain, p. 107 (Page 22). 
18 Am. Jur. on Eminent Domain, Sec. 244, at p. 881 
(page 23). 
United States v. 3,544 Acres of Land, 147 F. 2d 596, 
(Pages 25-26). 
City of Los Angeles v. Hughes, 262 Pac. 737, (page 
32). 
Redwood City Elementary School Dist. v. Gregoire, 
276 P. 2d 78, (page 38). 
City of Napa v. Navoni, 132 P. 2d 566, (page 34). 
Thornton v. Birmingham, 250 Ala. 651, 35 So. 2d 545, 
(page 34). 
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It is further submitted that no other authority cited 
by appellant supports its contention that it was error to 
deny appellant's motion to strike the testimony of 
Wright, Wallace and Benedict as to the fair market 
value. 
Finally, it should be made clear to this court that the 
experts' appraisals were not just made by simply adding 
ux3 the totals of the possible values of sixty-two lots and 
Tract 1-C, using this mathematical result as the fair mar-
ket value of Parcel 1. The opinions expressed were in 
each case judgment figures for the entire parcel. In ar-
riving at such opinions, each expert had of course taken 
into consideration a vast store of pertinent information 
reflecting or having an effect on values. This included, 
as expressly authorized by this court's opinion in State 
v. Peek, supra, lot values of the twenty-two comparable 
lots in this very area which had been sold on the open 
market shortly before the Legislature authorized this 
condemnation. 
For example, as to the witness Ralph B. Wright: 
(R. 229-230) 
"Q. Now, as I understand it, your assessment or 
appraisal of fair market value of the entire parcel is 
not the mathematical total of your individual ap-
praisals of all of the various parts, as I understand 
it? 
A. Yes sir, that's correct. 
31 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. That is, it isn't the total, or it is the total? 
A. Well, let me be specific. The total for all the 
figures—that is, for the three elements of Parcel 
1—is $314,250.00. 
Q. That is the mathematical total? 
A. That is the mathematical total of all the lots, 
plus the $14,000.00 which I ascribed to the area 1-C 
down in the corner. I rounded that off at $310,000.00 
Q. And, in doing that, you also took into consid-
eration the various other methods which appraisers 
have available to them as tools ? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. And the figure of $310,000.00 for the entire pe-
riod is your judgment figure based upon your ex-
perience ? 
A. That's correct." 
The trial court properly denied plaintiff's Motion 
to Strike. 
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Point 3. 
The court committed no error in admitting evidence, 
refusing to strike evidence, or in instructing the jury con-
cerning the valuation of the water system. 
a. Appellant does not challenge Mr. Ullrich's qual-
ifications as an expert, nor does it contradict his testi-
mony. Its major contention with respect to the valuation 
of the water system is that "the evidence clearly shows 
that its value is included within the values placed by the 
appraisers upon the land iteself and that to permit the 
jury to place a separate value upon it requires the State 
of Utah to pay for it twice, (p. 41) (Italics ours.) In 
support of this contention appellant states "we feel com-
pelled" to quote cross-examination; whereupon a por-
tion of the record is quoted at page 41 and 42 of the 
brief. 
Had appellant's feelings of compulsion caused it to 
continue to quote the record from page 231, it would have 
become abundantly clear that Mr. Wright did not include 
the value of the water system in his valuation of the 
land. The court's attention is invited to the record, page 
231, where appellant's quotation stops: 
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BY MR BEHLE: 
Q. Well, on this point now, of course, you took into 
your values the fact that water was ready and avail-
able, did you not? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q, And, if there hadn't been water, the values 
would have been lower just as they are lower be-
cause there is no sewer, is that correct? 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. But, as to the value of the water system that 
made that water available, were those independent 
values or are those reflected in the lot values? 
A. Well, the value of the water system itself is an-
other matter. The presence of the water system in 
the streets is reflected in my values for the lots, but 
that does not imply that the owner of the land owns 
the pipe or the water system itself. 
Q. In other words, the lot values with water would 
have been the same whether water came from Salt 
Lake City, Salt Lake County, the Deere Estate, or 
apart from the ownership of the source ? 
A. Yes sir, that's correct. 
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Q. And did you, or did you not, include in your 
figures the value of the water system itself? 
A. No, I did not. 
As is admitted by appellant on page 42 of its brief, 
witnesses Wallace and Benedict made similar statements, 
(e. g. R. 261) 
In appraising this land, the experts considered all 
the favorable factors operating which would give the 
land desirability as residential property. The availabil-
ity of such facilities as power, gas, telephone, and water 
lines, roads, curbs, gutters, etc. naturally incidentally in-
creased the market value of the property. If there had 
been no water available on the property, the value would 
of course have been less. If the telephone lines were not 
installed, that also would be reflected in a decreased 
valuation of the land in question. However, that inci-
dental effect upon the fair market value has no relation 
to the actual value of the facility itself. 
The near proximity of the Indian Hills and Monu-
ment Park residential subdivisions also increased the 
value of the land in question. Could appellant be heard 
to argue that since presence of the Indian Hills sub-
division was reflected in the fair market value of the 
Deere Estate, that the owners of Indian Hills need not be 
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compensated should it be condemned? It could not. It 
is submitted that appellant's contention with respect to 
this extensive water system is equally ridiculous. 
The Deere Estate developed and owned a complex 
water collection, storage, transmission and distribution 
system which took a great deal of time and money to de-
velop. (E. 115, 197) This property was seized by the 
State of Utah in this condemnation proceeding. Yet, 
appellant contends that the Estate should not be com-
pensated for this valuable property beyond the incidental 
increased value which its presence contributed to the 
property which it served. 
Note that on page 45 of its brief, appellant contends 
the system had no market value except with the property 
condemned. There is no evidence in the record to sup-
port such a contention. Mr. Ullrich testified without con-
tradiction on cross examination as follows: (B. 324-5) 
1 . ' • • • 
Q. Mr. Ullrich, on what other areas in this vi-
cinity could this water be beneficially used? 
i 
A. The water in question could be used to supply 
domestic and culinary water to homes in Emigra-
tion Canyon over a distance extending from the 
mouth of the canyon to two miles up said canyon. 
Said water could also be used as a culinary and 
domestic supply to any building sub-division de-
veloped in the foothill area immediately south of 
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Emigration Canyon and above the area now 
served by Salt Lake City municipal water system. 
Similarly, said water could be used on any build-
ing subdivision in the foothills north of the pres-
ent State Park area. Said water could also be 
used as an auxiliary supply to Fort Douglas. 
This identical question was decided by this court in 
State v. Peek, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630. In commenting 
upon the refusal of the trial court to admit opinion evi-
dence as to the value of the water system (the very same 
evidence that appellant now claims should not have been 
admitted in the second trial) this court said in part: 
The court also erred in excluding appellant's 
opinion evidence on the value of their waterworks 
system. Appellant's witness showed himself qual-
ified to give an expert opinion on that question. 
He also testified that this system was capable of 
being used in connection with property outside of 
appellant's lands. * * * It undoubtedly would have 
aided the jury in determining the true value of 
appellant's property had all of these details been 
shown to them, for certainly they could more ac-
curately assess the valuation of this property if 
they had before them the value which the experts 
placed on this system in arriving at their over-all 
value of the property, and could test such valua-
tion by comparison with the opinion of an expert 
on the value of that kind of property. The value 
of such a utility is especially one which calls for 
expert opinion because such property is not 
bought and sold every day on the open market, so 
expert opinion thereon is almost mandatory. 
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Appellant does not contend nor does the record show 
that the testimony of the expert in the second trial is 
different in any way from that proffered at the first. I t 
simply contends that the court "improperly permitted 
the witness, Ullrich, to testify as to values of the water 
distribution and transmission system." A complete an-
swer is that the decision of this court stating that the 
value of the waterworks system was competent evidence 
is the law of the case. The evidence was properly ad-
mitted. 
b. It is further contended by appellant that this 
court did not intend that the water system be valued sep-
arately from the property condemned. The court's at-
tention is respectfully directed to the statement in State 
v. Peek, supra, at page 275, that "Respondent's own wit-
nesses treated this (the water-works system) as a 
valuable property right of appellants," Whether or not 
this court anticipated that this particular property right 
should be determined separately, or jointly with other 
property is not here important. It was a valuable prop-
erty right for which just compensation must be paid. 
Appellant does not challenge the pre-trial exercise of 
the trial court's discretion in permitting the jury to 
evaluate this particular property right as a unit; nor 
Instruction Number 11 (B. 81), quoted supra, in which 
the court instructs the jury to make separate findings as 
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to the values of the four separate property interests, one 
of which was the water system. It simply challenges the 
propriety of allowing the jury to consider evidence giv-
ing any value whatsoever to this property right. 
c. By the same token, appellant's Requested In-
struction 19, quoted at page 40 of its brief, was properly 
refused. This instruction would in effect strike the evi-
dence as to value of the water system which this court 
held to be proper in State v. Peek, supra. 
d. The trial court properly admitted the testimony 
of Mr. Brayton and Exhibit No. 39 as evidence of the 
value of the water system. It should be noted that Mr. 
Brayton gave no opinion as to value of the system. He 
simply testified from his own knowledge as to the cost of 
the system. (R. 317) In support of its contention appel-
lant cites cases saying that the cost of improvements is 
not admissible as evidence of the fair market value of the 
land improved. 
First, this is a minority view. The prevailing rule 
is stated in 29 C. J. S. 1267 as follows, to wit: 
Where the land is improved, and the im-
provements have an intrinsic value which must be 
added to the land in order to ascertain the market 
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value of the whole, evidence of the separate value 
of improvements is admissible. Livesch v. Board 
of Education of St, Bernard, 13 Ohio App. 161; 
Hall v. City of Providence, 121 A. 66, 45 E. 1.167; 
State v. Carpenter, 89 S. W. 2d 979,126 Tex. 604. 
Second, this line of cases has no application to the 
case at bar. As is shown by Instruction 11, quoted supra, 
that part of respondents' property comprised of the 
waterworks system was evaluated separately by the jury. 
This was done by exercise of the trial court's discretion 
(State v. Peek) to facilitate orderly and systematic pro-
cedure. Appellant took no objection to Instruction 11 
directing the jury to evaluate Parcel 1, Parcel 2, Parcel 
3 and the Water System separately, nor to the pre-trial 
order; and no abuse of direction is shown. 
In computing the value of the water system, its 
recent actual cost was material and was properly ad-
mitted as evidence of its fair market value. The rule is 
properly stated in 29 C. J. S., Eminent Domain, at page 
1267, as follows, to wit: 
Price paid for property: While there is au-
thority apparently to the contrary, evidence as to 
. the price paid for the property sought to be taken 
is generally held admissible as some evidence of 
its market value, except where the purchase was 
so remote in point of time from the condemnation 
proceeding as to afford no fair criterion of pres-
ent value * * *. 
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The rule is stated similarly in H. & H. Supply Co. 
v. U. S., C. A. Okl., 194 P. 2d 554, Thornton v. City of 
Birmingham, 35 So. 2d 545, 250 Ala. 651, 7 A. L. R. 2d 
773, and Regents of University of Minn. v. Irwin, 57 N. 
W. 2d 625. 
The rule is stated in 18 Am. Jur. 994, Sec. 351, as 
follows, to wit: 
When a parcel of land is taken by emi-
nent domain, it is competent, as evidence of its 
market value, to show the price at which it was 
bought, if the sale was a voluntary one, and not so 
remote in time as to have no bearing upon the 
question of present value. 
In Requested Instruction 19 (Brief p. 40) appellant 
admits that the only evidence in the record as to value of 
the water system was that supplied by witnesses Ullrich 
and Brayton. It does not complain that these witnesses 
assigned an erroneous value to the system. Its only con-
tention is that respondents should not be compensated 
for the water-works system at all. 
This theory is not only grossly inequitable—it is in 
direct contradiction of the opinion of this court and the 
law of this case declared in State v. Peek, supra. It con-
troverts established constitutional principles necessitat-
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ing the payment of just compensation for property seized 
by the State. The questioned evidence was properly ad-
mitted. 
Point 4. 
The court properly limited the evidence proffered by 
expert witnesses Solomon and Ashton. 
Appellant's concern on appeal, and failure to under-
stand the basis of the court's rulings below as to this 
point, may be due to lack of recognition both of the scope 
of direct and cross examination of expert witnesses and 
the trial court's powers with respect thereto. 
By pre-trial order or in the course of trial, the court 
in the exercise of sound discretion can limit even the 
right to call an expert witness at all, by curtailing the 
number to prevent endless trials. (U. R. C. P. 16 (4).) 
Its control over the expert testimony adduced is plenary, 
subject of course to review if arbitrary or capricious and 
prejudicial in result. Uniform Rules of Evidence, Rule 
56 et seq. 
Usually, the expert qualifies as such; and then on 
direct is asked if he has formed an opinion on the fact 
at issue; and if so, what that opinion is. In this case, the 
only facts at issue were the fair market values of the par-
cels and property condemned. Each expert, having qual-
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ified as such and having shown to the satisfaction of the 
court his competency to express an opinion of value, was 
permitted to testify to such on direct examination. 
On cross examination it is of course then appro-
priate, under general law as well as State v. Peek, supra, 
to test credibility, methods, etc. 
In the trial below appellant's first witness as to the 
land values—Kiepe, as noted on page 45 of the State's 
Brief, was permitted on direct examination to give a 
very thorough and comprehensive review of the basis of 
his expert appraisal, detailing the many steps he took in 
forming an opinion as to the fair market value of the 
property condemned. He of course had formed as a re-
sult an opinion of the fair market value of the three par-
cels, and on direct examination was further permitted to 
express such opinions, which were the only issues of fact 
involved. 
Also without objection by defendants, Kiepe on di-
rect examination was further permitted to give his es-
timates and opinions as to the possible expenses which 
might in the future be incurred by some assumed 
speculating subdivider who might care to purchase the 
whole of the Deere Estate property, including hypotheti-
cal surveying, planning, road building, construction of 
sidewalks, curbs and gutters, installation of utilities, 
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taxes, revenue stamps, abstracting, marketing costs, in-
terest on investment, and the profit which the imaginary 
speculator might reasonably anticipate. He was also 
permitted without objection on direct examination to put 
an estimated dollar value on each of these speculated 
expenditures. All this resulted in further lengthy and 
extensive cross examination which delved in detail into 
these "guesstimates." (R. 332-417.) 
Following this, the next expert witnesses for the 
State, Solomon and Ashton, were also permitted on di-
rect examination to show in equal detail their processes 
in arriving at the opinions which they then expressed of 
the fair market values with which the case was con-
cerned. (R. 418 et seq.) However, their direct testimony 
was restricted by the court upon defendant's objections, 
only in that they were not permitted to assign hypothetical 
dollar values as to each speculative possible future ex-
penditure. The issue may be clarified by quotations from 
the record at pages 428, 434, et seq.: 
THE COURT: The witness may testify to the 
methods he used in arriving at his judgment as 
to the value—the things he took into considera-
tion. I think he should not testify with respect to 
/ the values he put on individual elements he used 
in arriving at his conclusion. 
MR. HORSLEY: But I can inquire as to which 
elements make up which group without going into 
the numbers in each case, is that true? 
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THE COURT: Yes. 
# # * 
THE COURT: Here is the problem, Mr. Porter, 
as the Court sees it; what we are after here is the 
fair market value of this property on the twelfth 
of July, '51, as the property was. 
MR. PORTER: That's right. 
THE COURT: Now, what you are seeking to do 
is to establish value, not of what the property was 
at that time, but of a price—may I say—that a 
a speculator might hope to realize out of it at 
some future time. 
MR. PORTER: No, we are not Your Honor. 
THE COURT: And, then deduct from that cer-
tain expenses, which, if he did that, he might have 
to meet and say, "Now, the result is the fair mar-
ket value." 
MR. PORTER: I think it goes a lot further than 
that, Your Honor. 
THE COURT: Now, the market value of that 
property isn't what it would be if it had sewer 
and paved roads, and all the utilities in there, and 
then take a value, then go and take those things 
out and say, "Now, it cost that much to do that." 
# # * 
MR. PORTER: Now, for the record, we make the 
same proffer of evidence to be asked the witness 
Ashton as to Parcels 2 and 3, as was made with 
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respect to Parcel 1 to include the same items, or 
approximately the same items, and we make the 
same proffer with respect to the witness Solomon, 
to be called as to all three parcels. The evidence 
in both cases to be pretty much the same, 
MR. BEHLE: Well, that is the figures. 
ME. PORTER: That's right. 
MR. BEHLE: Our objection is to the use of the 
figures; not to the process. 
The language from State v. Peek quoted on page 46 
of appellant's brief is entirely consistent with the action 
of the trial court. The court specifically permitted on 
direct examination, evidence of the value of the "various 
elements, Hems and parts" of respondents' property. It 
also permitted testimony as to the methods used in ar-
riving at fair market value of "various elements, items 
and par ts" of the property. All of appellant's evidence 
as to fair market value of the property in question on 
July 12, 1951 was admitted. None was excluded. The 
experts were permitted fully to explain their methods in 
reaching their expressed opinions as to the fair market 
values. 
The court, on objection by defendants and acting 
within its discretion, properly limited on direct examina-
tion only detailed opinion evidence as to the hypothetical 
particular amounts of possible future expenditures which 
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some imaginary speculating subdivider might make in 
disposing of the property some day if he ever might 
acquire it. 
Point 5. 
The court properly gave Instruction 15, and properly 
refused to give Requested Instructions 14 and 15. 
These instructions (R. 69, 70 and 86) pertained to 
the streets within and abutting the property of the defend-
ants herein condemned by the State of Utah. It is to be 
noted that the appellant excepted only to that portion 
of Instruction 15 dealing with Kennedy Drive (R. 519), 
which as given by the court reads as follows: (R. 86) 
INSTRUCTION 15 
The evidence in this case is undisputed that 
the defendants' property denominated Parcel 3 
and colored on Exhibit 1 in purple, while planned 
and suitable for residential subdivision purposes, 
nevertheless as of July 12, 1951 had not yet been 
so divided into separate lots which were then 
ready, available and intended for sale and use as 
such. 
Accordingly, in making your determination 
as to the fair market value of Parcel 3, you will 
assess separately first the tract abutting on and 
north of Kennedy Drive; secondly, the tract 
abutting on and south of Kennedy Drive, includ-
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ing the defendants' interests in the other half of 
Kennedy Drive as abutting owners subject to the 
public easement, and also including defendants' 
interests to the center of Michigan Avenue, since 
vacated as a public highway; and finally, the 
small area in the draw up Emigration Canyon. All 
these are colored purple on Exhibit 1. > 
Each of the three tracts will be separately 
valued by you, and the total of the three will con-
stitute your assessment of the fair market value 
of the parcel 3. 
It is submitted that the foregoing instruction, includ-
ing the portion to which exception was made, properly 
states the law. The court instructed the jury to include 
the property rights of the defendants as abutting owners 
of land adjacent to Kennedy Drive, subject to the public 
easement. The court did not instruct that defendants 
were the owners of the fee title. It just instructed the 
jury to value "defendants' interests to the center of Ken-
nedy Drive." These interests would be the same, 
whether the public interest in the Drive was still 
"owned" by Salt Lake County or was to be condemned 
and acquired from Salt Lake County by the State of 
Utah as first directed by the legislature until the amend-
ment discussed in the case of State v. Bird & Evans, 265 
P. 2d 639, 1 U. 2d 276. 
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Only the two cases cited by appellant at page 47 of 
its brief need be cited to show that an abutting owner 
does have a property interest in platted streets. Bosko-
vich v. Midvale City, 243 P. 2d 435, ( U ) does not 
hold that a platted street vests title in the city or the 
county, and that the abutting owners thereafter have "no 
further interest therein/' as contended by appellant. 
Just the reverse is true. This case clearly shows that an 
abutting owner has two valuable rights in a platted pub-
lic road: 
(1) An easement to the roadway which may not 
be taken by the governing authority without 
the payment of just compensation. 
(2) A right to tbe possession and ownership to the 
center of the roadway when and if the govern-
ing authority vacates the public street. 
These were valuable property rights appurtenant to 
the defendants' abutting land. The court properly in-
structed that the value of such rights should be consid-
ered when valuing the abutting property. 
White v. Salt Lake City, 239 P. 2d 210, U. , 
also recognizes a valuable property right to the center 
of a public road, appurtenant to abutting land. This 
court stated the law to be as follows : 
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The segregated statutory provisions are rec-
oncilable when construed to mean that the county 
or city authorities are vested with the fee in the 
streets. Such ownership carries with it the right 
to use it f\or the enumerated purposes when, in 
their discretion, it best serves the public interest. 
If the street should cease to serve any public in-
terest, it may be abandoned and, in that case, the 
right to the use and control of the roadway would 
revert to the abutting owner pursuant to 36-1-7 
and the common law principles. (Italics ours.) 
Consequently, the court also properly refused to 
give Requested Instructions 14 and 15. They do not cor-
rectly state the law. They give no value to the two prop-
erty rights of the abutting landowner above set forth. 
Under these suggestions of the State, rejected by the 
court, property interests would be taken from defendants 
without payment of just compensation. 
Point 6. 
The failure of the court to instruct as to burden of 
proof, if error, was not prejudicial 
Throughout the conduct of the trial, all recognized 
the owners' duty to go forward with the burden of pre-
senting evidence to the jury as fact-finder upon which 
to enable it to determine the issue of fair market value. 
(Augmented record dated June 15, 1955.) 
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In the proposed instructions submitted by both 
parties a specific instruction on burden of proof was in-
cluded since at no time was such in dispute. (R. 57) 
Normally this would immediately precede the old " pre-
ponderance of evidence'9 definition, which is contained in 
the stock printed instructions of the District Court which 
were given in this case. (R. 92) Appellant's requested 
Instruction No. 2 included also this "preponderance of 
the evidence" definition, and also other portions which 
were at least controversial, causing the court to reject 
same in the form requested. 
The omission of the stock "burden of proof" was 
not noted at the time the instructions were given by 
counsel or the court, and certainly were not in the mind 
of counsel for the State when objection was made to the 
rejection of Request No. 2 in the following language: 
"We except to the failure of the court to give 
plaintiff's requested Instruction No. 2, for the 
reason that said instruction does not correctly 
state the law, and failure to give it was prejudi-
cial to the plaintiff; the said requested instruc-
tion speaks for itself in that respect. (R. 517-18.) 
(Italics ours.) 
Was the omission of a specific instruction as to 
burden of proof, and the refusal to which the above ex-
ception was made, prejudicial to the fair trial of the is-
sues of value in this case ? 
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It is agreed that in the decision of Tanner v. Provo 
Bench Canal & Irrigation Co., 40 U. 105, 121 Pac. 584, 
this court aligned itself with those jurisdictions placing 
the burden on the owner to prove the value of the prop-
erty condemned. However, burden of proof is not as 
critical in eminent domain proceedings as in other areas 
of the law. Some jurisdictions have wisely ceased to give 
even lip service to "Burden of Proof" in condemnation 
cases. 
In City of Cincinnati v. Tuke et al., 44 N. E. 2d 748 
(Ohio), the court stated as follows: 
In such a proceeding, there are no formal 
pleadings or definite issues, which admit of af-
firmation upon one side and denial upon the 
other, and hence the doctrine of "burden of 
proof" has no application. 
The jury acts merely as an appraising or 
assessing board, determining the fair market 
value of the property from all the evidence sub-
mitted. 
In Bank of Edenton et al. v. United States, 152 
F. 2d 251, the court states as follows, to wit: 
It may be noted that the entire concept of 
burden of proof does not lend itself too readily to 
application in condemnation proceedings, and, in 
at least one jurisdiction, has been entirely re-
jected." 
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The jury could not have been misled in this case. 
Respondents opened the case and presented their evi-
dence first. They assumed the role of a plaintiff through-
out the case, meeting the burden of carrying forward the 
evidence. At page 331 of the transcript Mr. Behle, for 
respondents, says: 
"The plaintiff rests—rather, the defendant 
rests; the defendant being in the nature of the 
plain tiff." 
The verdict of the jury was nearer to the valuation 
of respondents' witnesses than to those given by wit-
nesses for appellant, indicating that it was more con-
vinced by their testimony. 
Bank of Edenton et al. v. United States, supra, is 
similar to the case at bar. There, not only did the court 
refuse to place the burden of proof upon defendant, but 
expressly instructed the jury that the government had 
the burden. In holding the error immaterial, the court 
said: 
The majority rule, which has been generally 
adopted in the federal courts, places the burden of 
proof of value in condemnation proceedings upon 
the landowner. A number of jurisdictions, how-
ever, follow a contrary view and place the burden 
upon the condemnor. (Citations listed.) The rec-
ord does not show which practice is customary in 
the State courts of North Carolina. But, in any 
case, the assignment of the burden of proof to the 
government is not a material error. (Italics ours.) 
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In Malvin v. County of Blue Earth, 46 N. W. 2d 464 
(Minn.) the court held that the failure of the court to 
instruct as to Burden of Proof was not a reversible 
error. The court states: 
We are of the opinion that the omission was 
not prejudicial. The only question submitted to 
the jury was the amount of benefits and damages. 
Damages and benefits m some amount must be 
conceded. The sole question was how much. The 
testimony of the county's witnesses and those who 
appeared for respondents was so far apart that it 
appears to have been largely a question of which 
group of witnesses the jury would believe. We do 
not feel that the jury's verdict would have been 
different if the court had instructed that the bur-
den of proof rested on respondents. (Italics ours.) 
Wiegand v. Siddons, 41 Appeal Oases, Dist. of Co-
lumbia (Tucker 1919-13) 130, is also similar to the case 
at bar. In that jurisdiction, the burden of proof was 
upon the government. However, the trial court refused 
to grant an instruction placing the burden upon the Dis-
trict of Columbia. In that case, as in the case at bar, the 
party with the burden assumed it and went forward with 
the evidence. In holding the error non-prejudicial the 
court said: 
In the absence, therefore, of any showing 
that the assessment was inequitable or arbitrary, 
we must hold that the refusal of the court to 
grant the instruction in question was not so pre-
judicial to appellants as to justify a reversal of 
the judgment. 
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It is submitted that the proposed instruction in ques-
tion was properly refused. Although in this state the 
burden of proof as to value is on the defendant, this in-
struction does not properly assign it. The last sentence 
of said instruction was unnecessary. It stated as fol-
lows: (R. 57) 
Therefore, if you believe that all the evidence 
is evenly balanced, you will reject the proposi-
tions advanced by the defendant as to value, and 
as to damages, and will accept those advanced by 
plaintiff. 
It created a real danger of confusing the trier of fact and 
was properly refused. 
It is further submitted that even if it was error to 
refuse the instruction, such error in no way prejudiced 
the State of Utah. Defendants assumed the burden. The 
owners were treated as a plaintiff throughout the trial. 
That the jury fully understood its function is indicated by 
the following (comparable figures for the other two 
property items valued by the jury have been given at the 
opening of this brief): 
Parcel 2. 
State Estate 
..$56,500.00 (R. 361) Wright $115,000.00 (R. 183) 
.. 71,320.00 (R. 439) Wallace 107,000.00 (R. 252) 
.. 92,500.00 (R. 474) Benedict 107,000.00 (R. 287) 
Jury's Verdict $91,500.00 (R. 93) 
Parcel 3. 
Kiepe $56,400.00 (R. 358) Wright .....$75,000.00 (R. 184) 
Ashton 73,090.00 (R. 440) Wallace 72,700.00 (R. 254) 
-Solomon 58,500.00 (R. 474) Benedict 76,700.00 (R. 288) 
Jury's Verdict $70,000.00 (R. 93) 
Kiepe ... 
Ashton 
Solomon 
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Obviously the jury below was most conservative, and 
in reaching its own independent justment as to the values 
involved, in each case used a figure somewhat less than 
the highest estimate of the State's own expert appraisers. 
The verdict would have been no different had the omitted 
sentence in the requested instruction been given. The 
award was neither arbitrary nor inequitable, but was 
entirely fair and reasonable under the evidence. 
The jury was not misled by the alleged error; it 
was charged to " determine separately the value of each 
of the four items * * * and from the evidence in the 
case, viewed and construed in the light of the law as 
given in these instructions, * * * return a verdict showing 
the value you find as to each parcel or item, and the 
total of all." (R. 82) Precisely this, the jury did. (R 
93) The trial court committed no prejudicial error. 
Point 7. 
The court properly included and computed interest in 
the judgment below. 
In considering this final point raised by the State 
in appealing from the judgment of compensation below, 
we understand that there is no controversy as to the 
following: 
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1. Defendants' property was actually taken, as 
determined by this court in State v. Peek, supra, by final 
judgment of condemnation duly made, entered and re-
corded May 27, 1952 (E, 43-51); whereupon legal title 
to the property so taken vested by operation of law in 
the State of Utah for the purpose of the State Park 
(Sec. 78-34-15, U.C.A. '53). 
2. Subject to other points raised by this appeal and 
exclusive of interest, these defendants are entitled to 
receive as compensation the sum of $632,145.00. This 
amount is "the total fair market value on the 12th day 
of July, 1951 of the property of the defendants named 
herein taken by the State of Utah by said judgment of 
taking dated May 27, 1952 and all severance damages 
resulting from such taking." (E. 98; Sec. 78-34-11, 
U.C.A. 1953.) 
3. As a condition precedent to the entering of the 
statutory "final judgment of condemnation," defendants 
pursuant to Sec. 76-34-16, U.C.A. 1953 filled "an abandon-
ment of all defenses to the action or proceeding except 
as to the amount of damages * * * in event that a new 
trial shall be granted." At that time the judgment of 
compensation as first made and entered herein on May 
13, 1952 was in the sum of $495,875.00. (E. 43) 
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4. Responsive to mandate of this court issued in 
P&ek v. the District Court, Case No. 7860, on January 5, 
1953 there was paid to these defendants, respondents 
herein, the "upset price" for their land so taken of 
$495,874.00. (R. 98) Mt. Shasta Power Corporation v. 
Dennis, 225 Pac 877 (Calif.). 
5. On appeal from the first judgment of compensa-
tion of May 13, 1952 that judgment was reversed in 
Peek v. State, 1 U. 2d 263, 265 P. 2d 630; and upon 
retrial of the sole remaining issues of value in the con-
demnation proceedings, the judgment from which the 
present appeal is taken was entered November 5, 1954. 
(R. 99) As stated above, thereby defendants' damages 
for their land taken and their severance damages were 
determined to be $632,145.00, resulting from the State's 
final Judgment of Taking of May 27, 1952. (R. 98) 
6. In addition, and as part of the constitutional and 
statutory requirements of an award of "just compensa-
tion," defendants are entitled to interest thereon at least 
from the date of actual legal taking, namely, from May 
27, 1952 rather than the date when summons was served. 
(Peek v. State, supra.) 
7. As to the interest rate to be allowed, under Sec-
tion 15-0-4 the legal rate for judgments as construed 
by this court in the Danielson case is eight per cent; 
otherwise the legal rate under Section 15-0-1 is six per 
cent. 
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Judge Martin M. Larson, the trial judge here 
responsible for computing interest on the award for the 
property taken from respondents on May 27, 1952, was 
not confronted with the problem in the Danielson case, 
247 P. 2d 900, which as a recent pronouncement of this 
court was well in mind. Here we had no "mere inter-
locutory order,'' with neither a taking, nor a definitive 
determination that the property would be taken, as was 
the mandate of the Utah Legislature concerning the 
Monument Park area. 
Nor was there here involved a mere "final order" 
as appellant mis-states on page 52 of its brief. Legal 
title had here actually passed irrevocably, at the State's 
own election, on May 27, 1952 when the court below made 
and entered its "Final Judgment of Condemnation." 
When the State that day recorded this Final Judgment, 
title passed to it from the owners by operation of law. 
Sec. 78-34-15. The wording "Final Judgment" is that of 
the same legislature which has said that in the case of 
a "judgment," interest shall accrue at eight per cent. 
After this taking and passing of title, the former 
owners so deprived on that date of their property from 
then on had no defense. They had the monetary right, 
under both the State Constitution and the Fourteenth 
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Amendment to the Federal Constitution, to receive 
$632,145.00 for the taking of their property, together with 
the right to interest accruing between time of taking and 
date of payment for the period when they were also 
deprived of the required compensation for the value of 
their property so taken. 
Under these circumstances the trial court held that 
an entirely different situation from that of the Danielson 
case was involved. Accordingly the court computed inter-
est at the judgment rate from May 27, 1952. This of 
course was the date when the property was taken by the 
final judgment; as of that date the sum of $632,145.00 
became due and owing defendants for the property then 
so taken. 
Such interest as of January 5, 1953, when partial 
payment was first made under mandate of this court 
in Case No. 7866, amounted to $31,888.09, as recited 
in the judgment below. (R. 99) Thus at this latter date, 
the State of Utah owed the Deere Estate the sum of 
$664,033.09, principal and interest. 
Then the trial court credited that amount with the 
partial payment of $495,875.00, leaving a balance still 
owing the former owners for their property taken May 
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27, 1952 of $168,158.09. Interest on that balance had 
accrued to November 5, 1954 in the sum of $24,663.10. 
This was properly added to the unpaid principal balance 
to determine the total owing to the defendants as of that 
latter date. Judgment for the total accordingly was so 
made and entered. (R. 99) 
It is submitted that the trial court followed the 
statutes and Constitution of the State of Utah and the 
requirements of the Constitution of the United States 
in so including and computing interest on the award. 
Thus only can appellant compensate the former owners, 
not only for the value of the property taken from them 
by the State of Utah, but for the delays they have 
encountered in receiving payment since they were de-
prived of their property on May 27, 1952. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
On this fourth proceeding before the Supreme Court 
of Utah involving a relatively simple condemnation case, 
this controversy between the State of Utah and the 
owners whose property it voluntarily took should finally 
be put at rest. As to the judgment of just compensation 
from which this appeal is taken, it is respectfully sub* 
mitted that: 
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1. No error was committed below as to the admis-
sion or rejection of evidence. 
2. The jury was properly and fairly instructed by 
the learned trial judge, and performed its function and 
duty in determining the four remaining factual issues in 
this extended litigation. 
3. Interest on the award since the actual legal taking 
of defendants' property on May 27, 1952 was properly 
included and computed. 
4. The judgment of compensation from which this 
appeal was taken was duly and regularly made and 
entered. 
It is respectfully submitted that this judgment 
should be forthwith affirmed, costs to respondents. 
C. C. PARSONS, 
A. D. MOFFAT, 
CALVIN A. BEHLE, 
KEITH E. TAYLOR, 
Attorneys for Defendants and 
Respondents. 
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